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will be construed as giving authority for such recording so that it will
carry constructive notice to grantees of the realty. Under either procedure, he subjects himself to the possibility that his hopes will not
be realized.
To clear up the course open to such a chattel mortgagee and to
fairly protect purchasers of the land from claims of chattel mortgagees
which are not in the real property records, it is suggested that a provision requiring recordation with the realty records similar to that at
present provided for conditional sales contracts would be a highly desirable legislative enactment. Such a statute seems to afford the best
way to adjust the rights of the chattel mortgagee and those who subsequently deal with the realty.
Ross REIm.
RECOLLECTION ON THE WITNESS STAND
The art of witness interrogation is difficult where the witness on the
stand is unable to narrate the event which he has observed because of
some present defect in his recollection.' In such case there are the
following possibilities:
A. The impressions once made upon the mind of the witness may
be revived by some means. This is "present recollection revived". 2
B. If a record has been made of the witness' impressions, such record
may come in as evidence if certain requirements be met. This is "past
recollection recorded". 3
The purpose of this comment is to collect the Washington cases involving these situations and to indicate whether or not our court follows the usual rules, analyzing those cases which have departed therefrom which special regard to some recent decisions which seem out of
line.4 Reference will also be made to illustrative'cases from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals as indicative of the rules followed by the
Federal Court for this circuit.

A.

PRESENT RECOLLECTION REVIVED

The witness testifies as to what is actually called up from the recesses of his memory. For the purpose of reviving a recollection anything may be used. 5 Most commonly it is a writing, around which
centers most of the difficulty because of the frequent failure to distinguish between the present situation where the witness is now testifying as to what has been recalled to his mind and the situation,
treated subsequently, where the witness, though without any present
1 Essential testimonial qualifications are observation, recollection, and
narration. 1 WIGMnOP, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 478.
2 id. § 758 et seq.

32 id. § 734, et seq.

' State v. Harkness, 1 Wn. (2d) 530, 96 P. (2d) 460 (1939); Clausen v.
J6nes, 191 Wash. 334, 71 P. (2d) 362 (1937).
Jewett v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Hinkleman
v. Pasteelnick, 3 N. J. Misc. 1010, 130 Atl. 441 (1925); Note (1926) 24 MIcH.

L. REV. 420
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recollection, has made a fairly reliable record of the event.
It may be any writing. The following are the generally accepted
rules relative to the use of a writing for the purpose of refreshing
memory.
7
1. The writing need not be made by the witness himself.
8
Early Washington cases indicated that the writing should be made
by the witness himself but subsequent cases 9 have not so required and
Washington would probably now follow the general rule, as does the
federal court.' 0
2. The writing need not be the original, but may be a copy."
The recent case of Clausen v. Jones12 requires the original, although
two years before, in Schmidt v. Van Woerden, 3 not mentioned in the
later decision, a copy was used. If Clausen v. Jones be taken at face
value, Washington is out of line, but a closer analysis of the case
indicates that present recollection was not involved.' 4 The federal
court recognizes a copy may be used.' 5
3. The writing need not be made at the time of the event."6
Again there is inconsistency in the cases. Bergman v. Shoudy' 7 held
that a memorandum made seven months after the event could not be
used to refresh the memory. Yet for the same purpose the use of bills
62 WicoRE, EVIDENCE § 758. The cases often require that the witness
know that the writing is correct, otherwise he may be subject to incorrect
impressions. State v. Patton, 255 Mo. 245, 164 S. W. 223 (1914); Seattle v.
Erickson, 99 Wash. 543, 169 Pac. 985 (1918).
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 759. "If upon looking at any document he can so
far refresh his memory as to recollect a circumstance, it is sufficent; and it
makes no difference that the memorandum is not written by himself, for it
is not the memorandum that is the evidence but the recollection of the witness." Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty 124 (1814).
1 Williams & Co. v. Miller & Co., 1 Wash. Terr. 88 (1860). A bill of particulars made in the handwriting of the witness could properly be used. Bergman v. Shoudy, 9 Wash. 331, 37 Pac. 453 (1894) (requiring the memorandum
to be made by the witness.)
Seattle v. Erickson, 99 Wash. 543, 169 Pac. 985 (1918). "Conceding that
a witness might refresh his recollection for the purpose of testifying in
court by reference to book entries made by another, there should at least
accompany the offer of such proof a showing that the witness knew the entries to be correct." State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P. (2d) 15 (1935)
(out of court use by the witness of a transcript of stenographic notes made
when the defendant was questioned on being taken into custody.) Frair v.
Caswell, 79 Wash. 470, 140 Pac. 564 (1914) (bill of particulars).
'8 Pacific Coast S. S. Co. v. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 94 Fed. 180 (C. C. A.
9th, 1899); see Jewett v. United States, supra note 5; Olmstead v. United
States, 19 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) (typewritten record book made
by the wife of the witness). See Hoffman v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 410
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (indicating that it wasn't important by whom the statement was made.)
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 760.
11191 Wash. 334, 71 P. (2d) 362

(1937). Notes (1937) 17 OaE. L. REV. 78;
(1927) 13 WASH. L. REV. 61.
" 181 Wash. 39, 42 P. (2d) 3 (1935).
14See note 51, infra.
"nGoodfriend v. United States, 294 Fed. 148 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923). See
Jewett v. United States, supra note 5. Olmstead v. United States, 19 F. (2d)
842 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) (typewritten copy of memorandum of overheard
conversations). Prentiss v. Chandler, 85 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936)
(memorandum from documents, some of which were in court).
S2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 761.
179 Wash. 331, 37 Pac. 453 (1894).
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of particulars, which most likely would be made at some considerable
time after the event, was upheld in a prior case"8 and in a subsequent
case.1 9 It-is probable that Washington would follow the usual rule. The
dicta in the Jewett case 20 and in Hoffman v. Uizited States21 indicates
this rule to be the one followed by the federal court.
4. The memorandum
may be used by the opponent for purpose of
22
cross-examination.
This rule is recognized in both jurisdictions where the writing was
used in court. 22 Washington has declined to apply it where the memo24
randum was used out of court for the purpose of refreshing memory.
If the witness has made a memorandum at some prior time but does
not resort
to it, there is no reason why the opponent should have access
25
to it.

5. The writing cannot be introduced and is not part of the evidence,:i
but at the request of the opponent or the jury the jury may see it to
determine the propriety of its use.
While the Washington court has held that the proponent of the witness cannot put in the memorandum, 27 it has also refused to allow the
opponent the right to have it go
to the jury.28 The federal court would
29
evidently follow the usual rule.
6. The cross-examiner may use it to revive recollection.30
Dictum in State v. Tyree8 indicates that Washington
would follow
2
this rule, as would probably the federal court.
"Williams & Co. v. Miller & Co., 1 Wash. Terr. 88 (1860).
Frair v. Caswell, 79 Wash. 470, 140 Pac. 564 (1914).
See note 5 supra.
87 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). "It is not so important when the
statement is made ... if it serves the purpose to refresh the mind and unfold the truth."
"2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 762.
"State v. Tyree, 143 Wash. 313, 255 Pac. 382 (1927); Green v. United
States, 19 F. (2d) 850 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) (opponent denied right to take
into possession the volume containing the memorandum, but not denied
the right to inspect it); Brownlow v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A.
9th, 1925) (opponent denied right to entire volume but not the particular
memorandum).
" State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P. (2d) 15 (1935). Wigmore contends that the same rule should apply as where used in court, the risk of
imposition being as great. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 762.
*Mullaney v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 638 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936); cf.
Butcher v. Seattle, 142 Wash. 588, 253 Pac. 1082 (1927).
"2 WiGmoan, EVIDENCE § 763.
" Kirkpatrick v. Collins, 95 Wash. 399, 163 Pac. 919 (1917) (receipt stubs
of payments testified to by the witness from present memory held improperly admitted); Dennis v. Trick, 165 Wash. 403, 5 P. (2d) 493 (1931)
(appellants diary used to refresh her recollection excluded).
" State v. McKeown, 172 Wash. 563, 20 P. (2d) 1114 (1933); State v.
Tyree, 143 Wash. 313, 255 Pac. 382 (1927) (exclusion based on improper and
inadmissible matter in the memorandum).
"Wells v. United States, 257 Fed. 605 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) (memorandum
going in after being used to refresh was held technical error but not prejudicial); Luse v. United States, 49 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) (the admission of a memorandum used to refresh the recollection was held error).
"12 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 764.
"1 143 Wash. 313, 255 Pac. 382 (1927).
" Hoffman v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
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Another factor to be considered is whether the stimulation of the
memory should be done in the presence of the jury. There has been
little judicial expression on this and in most cases it would make no
difference.38 The procedure in such cases should be left to the trial court.
Before dealing with preserved memory, it is worthwhile to reiterate
that the situation just discussed is one in which the witness has all
the circumstances in his mind, but momentarily is unable to recall them.
He sees a writing, something "clicks" in his mind, and he actually
remembers and testifies to what he remembers. Theoretically, his testimony is not a recital of what he reads, nor does he obtain any information from the memorandum. True, the mind is easily influenced by
suggestion and although a witness asserts he is testifying from his
memory and honestly believes that he is, it may be that some of his
"recollection" comes from the writing used to refresh his memory. Since
this can be detected by cross-examination and the trial court has the
witness, a ruling in such a situopportunity of seeing and hearing the
34
ation should rarely require reversal.
In considering the rules under the next heading it should be kept in
mind that the situation is entirely different from the foregoing and
that on principle none of the rules applicable to recorded memory apply
to the problem just discussed.
B. PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED

Now the witness has made a record of the event which record meets
the requirements outlined below and comes in as evidence. It is apparent
that a question of hearsay is presented, although no judicial discussion
of this aspect of the problem has been found. Wigmore says that no
hearsay is involved since the witness himself is in court and is subject
to cross-examination. 5 As pointed out by Morgan, in most cases the
witness cannot possibly be effectively cross-examined. 6 This out-ofcourt statement, not made under oath nor subject to cross-examination
at the time it was made, seems to be an exception to the hearsay rule.37
With this additional factor in mind, the following rules should govern
in order to insure a maximum of trustworthiness.
1. The past recollection must have been written down. 8
It is arguable that on principle the record may be oral.3 9 Nevertheless, such an extension of the rule would appear to offer a too convenient device to avoid the penalties of fabrication and this danger no
Where the witness looks at an object or reads over to himself some
writing no harm is done. Radley v. Seider, 99 Mich. 431, 58 N. W. 366 (1894).
In cases in which prejudice might result it would seem desirable that the
refreshing be done elsewhere than in the presence of the jury.
32 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 755, 765.

3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1530, 1560.

Morgan, Relation Between Preserved Memory and Hearsay (1927) 40
HARv. L. REV. 712.
Two requirements should be met, says Wigmore, before recognizing an
exception to the hearsay rule: a necessity and a circumstantial guaranty
of trustworthiness. 3 Wiomoaz, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-1422. See note 36 supra.
"2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 744.

" Shear v. Van Dyke, 10 Hun. 528 (N. Y. 1877). The witness testified that
although he couldn't now remember the number of loads of hay, he had at
the time called it out to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was allowed to testify
as to what that number was. One judge dissented.
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doubt outweighs the advantages otherwise gained. Neither Washington
nor the federal court has had occasion to pass on this.
2. The recollection must be trustworthy at the time of recordation.40
Two tests as to the time are used:
(a) The recollection should be fresh when recorded.
(b) The recollection should be recorded at or near the time of the
event.
Washington has not passed directly on this point although in the
decided cases the memoranda were made at or near he time of the
event. 41 The federal court
4 2 has only indirectly expressed itself in regard to this requirement.
3. The witness must guarantee the correctness of the record.48
This may be by recalling his state of mind at the time he made the
record, i.e., that he knew it was correct when it was made. The cases
arising in Washington involve writings made in the usual course of
business, it thus fairly appearing4 4 that the witness would not have made
the record unless it was correct.

It is necessary that the witness have actual personal knowledge of
the facts recorded, which has defeated
attempts in this jurisdiction to
45

introduce some certain records.

No federal cases on this point were found.
4. The witness need not himself be the writer.16
All that is necessary is that the witness saw the memorandum while
the facts were still fresh in his mind and at that time knew that it was
correct. There are no Washington cases directly in point although
the court has stressed the fact that the witness made the record himself where such has been the case. 47 The federal court has not passed
on this.
5. The originalis required, if available.48
This is the rule in Washington4" and in the federal court. 0 Clausen
v. Jones-" probably involved past recollection recorded although the
EVIDENCE § 745.
"Still v.Swanson, 175 Wash. 553, 27 P. (2d) 704 (1933) (bus inspector's
report); State v. Douette, 31 Wash. 6, 71 Pac. 556 (1903) (hotel register);
Callihan v. Washington Water Power Co., 27 Wash. 154, 67 Pac. 697 (1902)
(street car conductor's report).
"In Jewett v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), the court
distinguished the case before it from Goodfriend v. United States, 294 Fed.
148 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), by saying that the copies in the latter case were
made soon after the event and while the facts were still fresh in the memory and implied that had such been true in the Jewett case it would have
been governed by the general rule.

,02WIGMORE,

"32 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 746, 747.

"See note 41, upra.
Seattle v.Erickson, 99 Wash. 543, 169 Pac. 985 (1918); Tingley v. Fairhaven Land Co., 9 Wash. 34, 36 Pac. 1098 (1894).
"2

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 748.

"Still v. Swanson, 175 Wash. 553, 27 P. (2d) 704 (1933) ; State v. Douette,
31 Wash. 6, 71 Pac. 556 (1903).

"12 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE § 749.

Davis v. Associated Fruit Co., 135 Wash. 614, 238 Pac. 629 (1925). See
note 54, infra.
50 Jewett v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
191 Wash. 334, 71 P. (2d) 362 (1937). Action for personal injuries. The
witness was the doctor who had attended the plaintiffs and testified as to
4"
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opinion deals with the memorandum as having been used to refresh
the witness' recollection.
The reason for requiring the original is to make more sure that the
evidence is trustworthy and where there is2this assurance it would seem
unnecessary to apply the rule arbitrarily.
53
6. A copy made and verified by another is admissible.
This will arise most often in business transactions. It has been recognized as permissible in this jurisdiction.. 4 No cases from the ninth circuit were found.
7. The record must be shown to the opponent on demand, for inspec3
tion and cross-examination."
This point evidently has not been directly in issue in either jurisdiction.'5 6
8. The record goes as testimony to the jury.'57
This rule is followed in Washington.- 8 The federal court has not
passed on it.
9. The record must be complete, embodying substantially all that
the witness knew at the time of the event5 9
Apparently Illinois and Washington are the only jurisdictions in
which this requirement has been recognized. 6 °
Assuming the writing to have met these requirements, the question
arises: When may it go in as evidence?
the calls made and treatment given them. The witness professed to having
a present recollection of the relevant facts after having read a copy of his
office book. The court ruled that the original should have been used for
the purpose of refreshing his memory. It is submitted that the court reached
the proper result but used some unfortunate language. The situation involved was probably past recollection recorded. Part of his direct examination clearly shows no present memory, but complete reliance upon the
copy. Further the court cites 2 WiGMORE, EViDENCE § 749, which is the section now under consideration. Possibly the similarity of the expression
"past recollection recorded" and "present recollection revived" has led to
much of the confusion and some other designation should be used in referring to the two situations.
11In Davis v. Associated Fruit Co., 135 Wash. 614, 238 Pac. 629 (1925), the
defendant sought to show the condition of fruit when delivered to the railroad. A witness who had made a certificate as part of his duties in inspecting the fruit was called and while he had no present memory his testimony
appeared to qualify the certificate as the record of a past recollection. As
the certificate was the property of the railway company and could not be
let out of its possession the defendant offered to have it read into the
record. The court rejected the offer on the ground that the original was
necessary in order that the opponent might examin- it and have it go to
the jury room.
5"2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 750.
4Lawn v. Prager, 67 Wash. 568, 121 Pac. 466 (1912), contractor's book
of account admitted in evidence where the foreman testified as to the correctness of the original data and to the record made thereof.
52 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 753.

"See Davis v. Associated Fruit Co., supra note 52.
"'2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 754.
5"Still v. Swanson, 175 Wash. 553, 27 P. (2d) 704 (1933); see Davis v. Associated Fruit Co., supra note 52.
"Note (1939) 14 WASH. L. REV. 230.
"People v. Parker, 284 Ill. 272, 120 N. E. 14 (1918); Preston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 198 Wash. 157, 87 P. (2d) 475 (1939).
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"Is the use of the past recollection necessary; (1) because
in the case in hand there is not available a present recollection
in the specific witness, or (2) because in the usual case a
faithful record of a past recollection, if it exists, is more trustworthy and desirable than a present recollection of greater
or less vividness?"'O
The latter view would seem more desirable. The former is the socalled New York doctrine, which requires that an absence of present
recollection be shown as a preliminary to the use of a record of past62
recollection. Washington is committed to the New York doctrine.
The Circuit Court has not expressed its view as to this.
Not all the possibilities of preserved memory have been recognized
by the Washington court. There is a group of cases involving stenographer's notes of former testimony in which the court has flatly stated
that the stenographer cannot read his notes. 63 Since such notes meet
all the requirements for recorded memory, such rulings cannot be
justified.6
Another group of cases deals with records which were admitted as
business entries under. that exception to the hearsay rule."' Where
the witness has himself made the entries Wigmore suggests that they
really come in as past recollection recorded, avoiding many of the restrictions placed on the business entry exception. Recognition of
the true situation should make the task of the attorney and trial court
easier.
CONCLUSION

When dealing with these two situations under the stress of trial much
will have to be left to the discretion of the trial court. Whether we
wish to go to the extent recommended by Wigmore, that no exercise
of that judicial discretion should be reversible error, is doubtful.67 To
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 738.

State v. Mann, 39 Wash. 144, 81 Pac. 561 (1905). "As the question called
for the contents of the insurance policy, it is plain that, as between the witness' memory of what it contained and the memoranda of its contents made
by him, his memory was the best evidence, even though he had been compelled to use his memoranda to refresh his memory." In Kirkpatrick v.
Collins, 95 Wash. 399, 163 Pac. 919 (1917), after using receipt stubs to refresh his memory, the witness testified from present memory. Evidently
the stubs could have qualified as recorded memory, but their admission

was held error the court saying: "Manifestly, when the witness testifies
from his present memory, that which he may have written or said at some
other time concerning the facts of which he testifies, is incompetent."
State v. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204, 29 Pac. 1055 (1892) (no effort made to
qualify as past recollection recorded); Kellogg v. Scheuerman, 18 Wash.
293, 51 Pac. 334, 52 Pac. 237 (1897) (likewise no effort made to qualify);
Duffy v. Blake, 91 Wash. 140, 157 Pac. 480 (1916) (ruling citing only Kellogg v. Scheuerman, supra; State v. Harkness, 1 Wn. (2d) 530, 96 P. (2d)
460 (1939), where the previous cases were cited and also Preston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 198 Wash. 157, 87 P. (2d) 475 (1939), in which
it was recognized that stenographer's notes might come in as past recollection recorded.
2 WIGmOEE, EVIDENCE § 737.
" Callihan v. Washington Water Power Co., 27 Wash. 154, 67 Pac. 697
(1902); Lloyd v. Reinard, 133 Wash. 114, 233 Pac. 292 (1925). Cf. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Huetter, 68 Wash. 442, 123 Pac. 607 (1912).
03 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1560.
"2 WiG1oRE, EVIDENCE § 755.
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increase the benefits to be gained in the use of these two "memory aids",
and to decrease the possibility of error in these situations, the following suggestions are made:
1. The New York doctrine, requiring an absence of any present
recollection to introduce the record of a past recollection, should not
be longer followed.
2. The statements in Clausen v. Jones,68 applying past recollection
rules but calling the situation one of present recollection, should be
corrected.
3. A close analysis of each decided case on its facts, when cited as
authority, espectially those dealing with the use of stenographer's notes,
should be made.
4. Most important in avoiding confusion is effort on the part of both
the attorney and trial judge to differentiate between revival of memory
and recordation of memory, and the rules applicable to each.
This study brings with it the conviction that on the facts of the
decided cases the Washington court has probably reached the right
result in most of them but the trail is poorly marked and should be
re-blazed.
HARwoOD A. BANNISTER.

"Note 12, supra.

